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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-4147 
 ___________ 
 
 XIU REN DAI, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A089-254-184) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Frederic G. Leeds 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 11, 2012 
 
 Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: April 12, 2012) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Xiu Ren Dai, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of a Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision that rejected his application for asylum and 
withholding of removal.  For the following reasons, the petition for review will be 
denied. 
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 As the parties are our principal audience, we will briefly summarize the 
uncontested factual record.  In 1989, and while living in China, Dai and his wife had their 
first child, a girl.  Despite being fitted with an IUD the same year, his wife again became 
pregnant, and the couple‘s second child, a boy, was born in 1992.  At this time, Dai‘s 
wife was sterilized against her will; the couple was fined 9800 RMB (the equivalent of 
approximately $1,500); and Dai briefly went into hiding, although he was not otherwise 
injured.  Tragedy struck the couple in 1995, when their son died in an accident; in 
response, they applied for reversal of sterilization, but their request was not granted.  Dai 
continued to live and work (apparently without further incident) in China until 2007, 
when he departed for the United States and was admitted as a nonimmigrant.  Having 
overstayed his visa, Dai was placed into removal proceedings, in response to which he 
filed an I-589 requesting asylum or withholding of removal.  His wife and daughter 
remain in China. 
 After a series of hearings, the Immigration Judge (IJ) denied relief.  While finding 
Dai to be credible and sympathetic, the IJ nevertheless held that 1) he had failed to 
demonstrate that his treatment in China amounted to persecution, and 2) he had failed to 
demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution.  The BIA denied Dai‘s appeal, 
agreeing with the IJ that he had shown neither past persecution or a well-founded fear of 
future persecution.   
This petition for review followed.  Dai raises one claim before this Court: whether 
the BIA erred in holding that he had failed to establish past persecution.  Pet‘r‘s Br. 1. 
We have jurisdiction over the BIA‘s final order of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
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§ 1252(a).  When, as here, the BIA renders its own decision and does not merely adopt 
the opinion of the IJ, we review the BIA‘s decision.  De Leon-Ochoa v. Att‘y Gen., 622 
F.3d 341, 348 (3d Cir. 2010).  ―Our review of factual findings, including findings of 
persecution and fear of persecution, is for substantial evidence, which means we must 
uphold findings of fact unless the record evidence compels a contrary finding.‖  Yuan v. 
Att‘y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 2011). 
As a preliminary matter, we agree with the Government that the existence of past 
persecution is the only question before the Court.  While Dai included in his opening 
brief a glancing mention of the second pathway to asylum, a ―well-founded fear of future 
persecution,‖ we have held that merely referring to an issue does not suffice to preserve 
it.  See Laborers‘ Int‘l Union v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994).  
Accordingly, we will limit our discussion to the existence of past persecution. 
In Lin-Zheng v. Attorney General, 557 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc), we 
joined the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in holding that 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(42) does not ―extend automatic refugee status to spouses or unmarried partners 
of individuals [who are forcibly subjected to coercive family planning measures].‖  Id. at 
148 (quoting Lin v. U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 300 (2d Cir. 2007) (en banc)).  
To that end, we agree with the BIA that Dai is foreclosed from claiming a per se 
entitlement to asylum based on his wife‘s sterilization. 
We also agree that Dai has failed to ―allege other incidents of harm or economic 
sanctions that rise to the level of persecution.‖  BIA Op. 2.  ―Our oft-quoted, non-
exclusive list of examples of persecution ‗include[s] threats to life, confinement, torture, 
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and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or freedom.‘‖  
Cheng v. Att‘y Gen., 623 F.3d 175, 192 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 
1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993)).  Dai argues that the economic sanctions to which he was 
subjected and the social derision he faced from an inability to have a son amounted, in 
sum, to persecution.  But given his ability to pay the fine—and in light of his lengthy stay 
in China thereafter, during which he alleged little to no additional mistreatment—we 
cannot say that these incidents rise, individually or collectively, to persecution.  See id. at 
193–94 (discussing the severity of economic sanctions necessary for a finding of 
persecution).  As Dai fails to show that he is entitled to asylum, it follows that he cannot 
meet the ―more exacting standard‖ for withholding of removal.  Lin v. Att‘y Gen., 543 
F.3d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 2008); Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att‘y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 348–49 (3d 
Cir. 2008). 
 Therefore, as the record supports the BIA‘s decision, we will deny this petition for 
review. 
 
